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ABSTRACT
This article presents a case analysis
of RJR Nabisco Holdings Corporation's
foreign exchange management. The strat
egy pursued by RJR Nabisco, the two
headed-hedging strategy succeeded in
lowering it's foreign exchange risk. When
RJR's domestic affiliate was in the process
of buying an equipment from Germany in
1991, and the foreign exchange rate fluc
tuated, the approach manage to save the
company from losing millions of dollars
from foreign exchange transactions.
This study offers insights about the
two headed-hedging strategy and the ad
vantages and drawbacks of the strategy.
An analysis was done todetermine how the
strategy pursued benefit RJR Nabisco as a
total corporation. The result showed that
the key element to the success of the ap
proach has evolved around the centralized
control and management by the Treasury
team.
IJntroduction
RJR Nabisco Holdings Corporation
is among the largest tobacco and food
companies in theworld. In theUnited States,
the tobacco business is conducted by RJR
Tobacco Co., the second largest producer
of cigarettes, and the packaged food busi
ness is conducted by Nabisco Foods Group,
the largest manufacturer and mariceter of
cookies and crackers. Tobacco operations
outside the United States are conducted by
RJR Tobacco International; Inc. and food
operations outside the United States are
conducted by Nabisco International.
Together, their products are sold
undera varietyofbrand names in the United
States and other international markets.
Being such an active participant in the
intemational markets, RJR Nabisco is con
stantly exposed to the risk of fluctuating
foreign exchange rates. Its two-headed
hedging strategy has certainly contributed
to its success in saving the company from
the chaotic incident when Deutsche mark
fell from 1.75 to 1.84 within a twelve hours
period in May, 1991.
II.Terminologies
Foreign exchange risk
The likelihood that an unexpected change
in exchange rates will alter the home cur
rency value of foreign currency cash pay
ments expectedfromaforeignsource. Also,
the likelihood that an unexpected change in
exchange rates will alter the amount of
home currency needed to repay a debt de
nominated in a foreign currency. Three
types of foreign exchange risk: operating
exposure, transaction exposure and ac
counting exposure.
Hedge
The purchase of a contract (including for-
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ward foreign exchange) or tangible good
that will rise in value and offset a drop in
value ofanother contract or tangible good,
thus protecting the owner fiom loss.
Spot transaction
A foreign exchange transaction to be settled
(paid for) on the second following business
day.
Forward transaction
A foreign transaction agreed upon today
but to be settled at some specified future
date, often one, two or three months after
the transaction date.
Option
In foreign exchange, a contract giving the
purchaser the right, but not the obligation,
to buy or sell a given amount of foreign
exchange at a fixed price per unit for a
specified time period. Option to buy are
"calls" and option to sell are "put".
in.Two-headed hedging approach
This hedging strategy adopted by
RJR Nabisco simply means that the whole
process of hedging is operated by two
parties. The Treasury team based in New
Yoricis comprised ofPeter Daytz (director
offoreign exchange), Lynn Lane (assistant
treasurer-capital markets), and James
Scalfaro(managerofforeign exchange and
interest rates). Their role is to make good
choices that enhance the decision making
and the result of the otherparty of this two-
headed approach, the operating unit. Op
erating units are to determine how and
when to hedge.
TheTreasuryteamworks withtwelve
affiliates who are responsible for dollar-
based profit performance on adaily basis. It
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offers advice on hedging strategies that
may help performance. Every two months,
the operating unit gives data to the Treas
ury for evaluation. Operating units then
make their own decisions. However, the
Treasury has the power to disagree and
pureue. another strategy if it feels that it
would benefit the company.
Managing exposure this way has
afforded RJR many key benefits. For one,
operating units remain the primary "own
ers" of exposure. In this sense, they ^e
empowered to make currency decisions
that best allow them to meet business unit
contribution targets. Thisisjustifiedbythe
41% increase in operating income from
1989 to 1991, On the other hand, if there
should be a big disparity in views, ofwhich
way foreign exchange rates are going to
move, the Treasury still has the power to
protect the total corporation. Centralized
positions ease credit risk management too.
It is always advisable to execute all trans
actions in one office where highly experi
enced foreign exchange professionals are
staffed. Theonlydrawbackofthisapproach
is the need of a highly advanced front-and-
back computerized office system. This
would cost the company a fortune.
IV.Transaction exposure
Transaction exposure is the degree
to which the value of future cash transac
tion can be affected by exchange rate
fluctuations. The home currency value of a
firm's cash inflows received in various
currencies will be affected by respective
exchange rates of these currencies when
converted into the currency desired. Simi
larly, the home currency value ofthe firm's
cash flows in various currencies will de
pend upon the respective exchange rates of
these currencies.
RJR Nabisco generates $1 billion
currencyexposureannuallyfrom morethan
160 countries. Therefore, it is very im
portant to minimize the effect of foreign
exchange fluctuations on its foreign cur
rency transaction through hedging strate
gies. This analysis is primarilyfocusedon
RJR's transaction exposure. The com-
pany*s significant exposure to foreign ex
change sale and purchase transactions in
clude the U.S. dollar, German mark, Japa
nese yen, Swiss franc. Hong Kong dollar,
Singapore dollar and cross rate exposure
between French franc, British pound, Ital
ian lira and the German mark.
In May 1991, the Deutschemark fell
from 1.75 to 1.84 (a 5% Deutsche mark
devaluation) within a twelve hour period,
following the incident of the Soviet coup
attempt against Gorbachev. Many com
panies in theworld withoperating unitsin
Europe was affected millions in dollar-
based costs and profit margins. However,
RJR's two-headed hedging approach had
turned this dilemma into a blessing in dis
guise.
During the same period, RJR's do
mestic affiliate was in the process of buy
ing $70 miUion (DM 123.900,000) worth
of equipment from Germany, payable in
six months. The project had a budget rate
of 1.45 (DM 101,500,000), which the af
filiatewantedtoprotect Butit alsowanted
to lock in some saving. This operating unit
was too concerned over its performance in
terms of profits and operating income.
However, the Treasury team had a totally
different view. Theirprimaryconcemwas
to protect the corporation as a whole.
Therefore, they went againstthe wishesof
the operatingunit and decided to pursue a
strategywhich they thought wouldbenefit
RJR as a total corporation. Below is the
analysis for the strategy pursued.
Analysis
There are several alternatives for
RJR's domestic affiliate to purchase the
equipment.. RJR can either remain
unhedged, opt for a forward hedge or an
option hedge. Eachof these alternatives is
stated below.
1. Remain unhedged
Wait six months and then buy $70 mil
lion (DM 123,900,000) at the spot rate
at that time. If the six months forward
rate, DM 1.7778/$, to be the best pre
dictor of the future spot rate, the ex
pected costofpayment indollars would
be:
DM 123,900,000/1.7778
$69,692,878.83
The actual rate could be higher or lower
than the expected rate; so this expected
result is risky.
2. Forward hedge
Hedgein the forward marketby buying
Marks forward now at DM 1.7778/$.
The cost of payment six months hence
will be:
DM 123,900,000/1.7778
$69,692,878.83
This is the same as the unhedged result;
however, this amount is certain and so
less risky. Because the amounts are the
same, the forward hedge dominates;
remaining unhedged would only pose
higher risk.
3. Option hedge
With this alternative, the affiliate is to
hedgein the optionmarketby buying a
six-month call option of DM
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123,900,000 at a premium price of DM
0.02/$.
The spot rate: DM 1.77/$
The borrowing interest rate in U.S. is
3.5% per annum.
Cost of the premium:
$70mmion/DM 1.77=DM 123,900,000
DM 123,900,000/DM 0.02/$ =
$790,960.45
Future value cost of option:
$790,960.45 x 1.0175 = $804,802.26
RJR forecasted an anticipated range
for Deutsche mark to be between 1.50 and
1,90 for 1991 and 1992. They structured a
zero-range forward with the worst-case
strikeprice of 1.64 and the best-case strike
price of 1.88.
(1) Worst-case scenario
when strike price = DM 1.64/$, the cost
of option:
DM123.900,000/I.64=$75,548,789.49
plus future value cost of option:
$75,548,789.49 + $804,802.26 =
$76,353,582.75
The net cost is $76,353,582.75 and this
figure is greater than $70 million. This
, means that RJR will lose:
$76,353,582.75 - $70,000,000 =
$6,353,582.75
Compared to the forward hedge, this
worst-case scenario is $7,520,249.42
more costly. (Appendix 1)
(2) Best-case scenario
when strike price is DM 1.88/$, the cost
of option:'
DM 123,900,000/1.88=$65,904,255.32
plus future value cost of option:
$65,904,255.32 + $804,802.26 =
• $66,709,057.58
In the best-case scenario, the net cost is
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$66,709,057.58, which is less than $70
million.
The company can save: (Appendix 2)
$70,000,000 - $66,709,057.58 =
$3,290,942.42
The break-even exchange rate that
equalizes the cost of the option and the
forward hedge is:
(DM 123,900,000/x) + $804,802.26 =
$69,692,878.83
Therefore,x = DM 1.7986/$
WhenthedoUartopped 1.80,thetreasury
team advised the affiliate to buy calls..
(Appendix 3)
The net cost is:
(DM 123,900,000/1.80) + $804,802,26
= $68,833,333.33
Compared to the worst-case scenario, it
had cut about 10% off the total cost of
theequipment. Calculationforthis 10%
savings is illustrated below:
$76,353,582.75-$68,833,333.33
^ = 0.0985=10%
$76,353,582.75
Outcome
The ty/o-headed hedging approach
had certainly paid off. The key element to
the success of this approach has evolved
around the centralized control and man
agement by the Treasury team. Central
control and direction of foreign exchange
are prerequisites if there is to be a rational,
consistent approach to controlling expo
sure for the consolidated group. The con
solidated exposure ofa rriultinational com
pany like RJR, is the sum total of the
exposures of all its subsidiaries and operat
ing units.
As illustrated in the analysis, central
control can prevent an operating unit from
speculating on foreign exchange move
ments on its own initiative, whether in
hopes of turning a profit to cover up oper
ating problems or in expectation that there
willbefurtherexchange movement. Should
the decisionbe wrong, the impacton con
solidated earnings of such speculative ac
tivities could produce disaster.
V. Conclusion
Foreign exchange has been added to
the growing list of items with which top
operating management must deal. Like
other elements of the business, the foreign
exchange position must now be subject to
active management and review. Manage
ment needs to realize that it can lose more
money by neglecting the foreign exchange
aspect of international business than it can
make by pushing for a marginal increase in
international maricet penetration and sales.
For a multinational company to
manage foreign exchange risk efficiently,
its top management needs to be fully aware
of the risks and costs involved in dealing
with foreign exchange exposure, and even
then only if it is organized enough to man
age the exposure.
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